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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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Op-32B1/dhg
Serial: 00156P32

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MEMORANDUM:

From: Op-32B1B
To: Members, IAC Ad Hoc Committee to develop a recommended
U. S. Policy toward Soviet and Satellite service attaché
personnel.
Ref: (a) CIA Secret Serial ER-0-9989

1. Forwarded herewith are comments on the Air Force Memorandum
as requested by reference (a).

W. R. Wilson
W. R. Wilson
Commander, USN

Colonel D. W. Wackwitz, Room 4B-882, The Pentagon
Colonel A. J. D. Biddle, Room 2E-544, The Pentagon
Colonel R. Vance, Room 2E-961, The Pentagon
Mr. George Fearing, Room 300, State Annex 1
Mr. S. W. Reynolds, Room 7645, U.S. Dept of Justice Bldg.

USAF, CIA

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Navy review(s) completed.

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Comments by Navy Member on Air Force Memorandum "Formulation of Policy for the Treatment of Soviet and Satellite representatives on duty in the United States".

1. GENERAL

We disagree with the thesis that "U.S. observations in Moscow et alia are not important. Recent trips in various Russian areas, as apparently permitted, provide the only first hand observations of these areas in the past decade. Further constant exploitation is planned. Moreover, "on the spot" reporting by attaches is highly evaluated, while other sources are usually in a low category.

2. COMMENTS ON "DISCOURSES".

(a) Paragraph 3: The Soviets should only feel the effect of policy, but should not be told about it. Knowledge of its existence by them would be particularly undesirable if any part of it was not made completely effective.

(b) Paragraph 9: The proposed policy would not achieve the objectives listed.

(c) Paragraph 10: "It is believed that this hypothesis is not borne out by fact". Actually, this is the coordinated opinion of the people on the spot, and must be given due weight.

(d) Paragraph 11: Points up the ability of Soviet representatives in this country to evade the effect of restrictions, whereas paragraph 13 recommends certain restrictions. Any restrictions must be completely unavoidable, or they will backfire.

3. COMMENTS ON "REPRESENTATION".

(a) Paragraph 14: With regard to reference to U. S. Res. A/3, same comment as in 2 (a) above.

(b) Paragraph 14 (c): The code should not be publicized. The existing machinery for justifying request for recall is probably minute, whatever restrictions can be made effective.

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4. THE COLLECTING POLICY: THE PROBLEMS OF A COUNTRY WHICH IS FORMULATING THE COLLECTING POLICY:

(a) We must have the observations of our service attaches in Russia. Restricted as they may be, they are basic contributions toward resolving the fundamental intelligence question, "State or not?" The major contributors to this are the attaches in Russia proper; those in the satellites are minor. The capability of our attaches to make a valid contribution in this respect is largely contingent upon their ability to travel.

(b) It follows that we should implement no policy which will lose us the benefit of having service attaches in Russia, either by (1) Having to withdraw them, or (2) Russian retaliation in the form of further curtailment of travel.

(c) Within the limitations of (a) and (b) above, any "MILITARY" must actually hurt the Soviets, or it defeats its purpose. Retaliation must not be undertaken merely for the sake of retaliation; such such measure must be carefully studied for its repercussions on the situation and capabilities of our attaches abroad. The Soviets are respectful only of effective power; not of a show of power which cannot be effective beyond mere retaliation. With regard to restrictions on intelligence collecting capabilities of Soviet personnel here, none should be added unless they can be made so uniformly effective that all avenues of evasion are barred. Even this would be neutralized by our readily available publications and fellow travelers.

(d) When a policy is formulated, it should be referred to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow for study and further recommendation by all the service and State Department representatives prior to implementation.

(e) During and after formulation, policy, as such, should be kept under security restrictions; no publicity should be given even to the fact that there is a policy, or that one is under discussion. Confidential representations should be made via Legislative Liaison that action on H. J. Res. 433 should be discontinued, making such explanation for this recommendation as may be absolutely necessary, but with maximum security, (see (c) above). The Soviet should merely feel the effect of policy, but need not be told about it. Knowledge of its existence by them would be particularly undesirable if any part of it was not made completely effective.

5. SIGNIFICANT CONTENTS OF THE "MILITARY" POLICY:

(a) Delete paragraph 2 a. No advantage would accrue to us if this were implemented.

(b) Delete sub-paragraph 2 b. Same as (a) above.

(c) Sub-paragraph 2 c. Add to final sentence: "but not if they have a liaison passer". Change designation to "2 c."

SECRET

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(d) Add sub-paragraph 2 L. "Require exit visas, employing a procedure comparable to, and paralleling that used in the nations of the Soviet Bloc."

(e) Sub-paragraph 3 g. (1) (a) and (b); delete entirely. We have too much to lose by Soviet reprisal in this respect at present. It is doubtful, moreover, that this type of restriction could be made completely effective. The procedure for 3 a (1) (b) 2. can be set up within existing administrative machinery.

(f) Sub-paragraph 3 a (2); complete effectiveness as to restrictions on any of these items is doubtful, unless they were universal, rather than unilateral. Additional funds and personnel expended on such an effort probably would not be warranted by results.

(g) Sub-paragraph 3 a. (3) (a); delete. The Soviets do not generally do this.

(h) Sub-paragraph 3 a. (3) (b); delete. Go already to this where it is really necessary.

(i) Sub-paragraph 3 a. (3) (c); delete last sentence. Nothing gained by this restriction; some desirable contacts might be lost. See also paragraph 6 below; limitations on invitations extended generally to all attaches should be uniform.

(j) Sub-paragraph 3 a. (3) (d); It is recommended that this be rephrased as follows:

"A classified order should be promulgated to all service personnel that social and other contacts with representatives of the Soviet Orbit countries should be reported to the director of intelligence of their organization via their immediate superior".

(k) Sub-paragraph 3 a. (3) (f); additional funds expended on such an effort beyond what is now done probably would not be warranted by results. Some surveillance is already exercised.

6. It is recommended that policy on treatment of Soviet Orbit representatives in this country include provisions approximating the following:

"Attaches of countries in the Soviet Orbit will be given the same treatment in the matter of invitations to visit, and requests for information, as the attaches of other countries, subject to the following:

(a) Where the matter involved is completely unclassified, no restrictions.

(b) Where classified matter is involved, subject to national policy on security and the release of classified information, visits to any war vessel, station, establishment, agency, industrial plant,

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or exercise, will be permitted only on a continual basis; i.e., invitations or permits will be issued contingent upon the extension of reciprocal privileges to U.S. attaches in the corresponding Soviet Orbit country.

(c) Requests for information by Soviet Orbit attaches shall be dealt with in accordance with the same principles as in (a) and (b) above.

(d) In cases where only attaches of Soviet Orbit countries are involved, the contingent nature of invitations, permits, and responses to requests, must be clearly expressed, where required. In cases involving attaches of other countries as well as any in the Soviet Orbit, the format of invitations or permits should be uniform, but private verbal explanations can be given to the non-Soviet Orbit attaches, if "contingency" is expressed.

(e) Each agency represented on the IAT will keep other agencies participating informed of the problems encountered by its representatives in Soviet Orbit countries.

(f) No measures will be taken unilaterally in reprisal by any participating agency against Soviet representatives on duty in this country.

7. Rear Admiral Stevens, ex-Naval attaché to Moscow has indicated his willingness to be a witness, if called.

J. F. Wilson
Commander, U.S.

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